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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of the macroeconomy that reformulates what I take to be two important
ideas from Keynes General Theory. The first is that there may be a continuum of steady state unemployment
rates. The second is that beliefs select an equilibrium. I argue that search and matching costs in the
labor market lead to the existence of a continuum of equilibria and I resolve the resulting indeterminacy
by assuming that the beliefs of stock market participants are self-fulfilling. The paper reconciles Keynesian
economics with general equilibrium theory without invoking the assumption of frictions that prevent
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rfarmer@econ.ucla.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper is an attempt to reformulate what I take to be two key insights
from Keynes’ General Theory (Keynes, 1936). The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h e r ei ss o m e -
thing profoundly diﬀerent about the labor market from most other markets
in the economy. The second is that the beliefs of participants in the asset
markets have an independent inﬂuence on economic activity. In the language
of modern dynamic general equilibrium theory, we would say that there is a
continuum of labor market equilibria and that beliefs about the value of the
stock market select an equilibrium.
The General Theory contains many ideas, some of which are internally
inconsistent, and Keynes did not try to reconcile his theory with Walrasian
economics. That task was carried out by a group of interpreters including
Alvin Hansen (1936) and John Hicks (1937). The current dominant para-
digm, new-Keynesian economics, originated with the third edition of Paul
Samuelson’s (1955) undergraduate textbook in which he introduced the idea
of the neoclassical synthesis. According to this doctrine, the economy is
Keynesian in the short run but classical in the long run. The short run is
deﬁned as the period over which not all prices have had time to adjust to
their Walrasian levels.
This paper introduces a diﬀerent interpretation of the key ideas from the
General Theory.1 Although my work is inspired by Keynesian economics, this
paper is not about the history of thought. I oﬀer a way of formulating the idea
that market economies are not inherently self-stabilizing without assuming
that prices or wages are prevented from adjusting to their equilibrium levels
1The ﬁrst paper to discuss the equilibrium concept that I use here is Farmer (2008b)
and the concept is deﬁned formally in Farmer (2010b). Related papers include Farmer
(2010c) and Farmer and Plotnikov (2010) which explore the role of ﬁscal policy in the old-
Keynesian framework, Guerrazzi (2010) which uses a version of the old-Keynesian model
to resolve Shimer’s 2005 puzzle and Gelain and Guerrazzi (2010) and Farmer (2010a)
which estimate the old-Keynesian model using Bayesian methods. The old-Keynesian
equilibrium concept is extended to models with multiple commodities in Farmer (2008a).
1by some kind of friction. Instead, I claim that high, persistent unemployment
is a potentially permanent feature of a market economy in a steady state
equilibrium.
2 R e l a t i o n s h i pw i t hS t a n d a r dS e a r c hM o d e l s
Peter Diamond (1982a, 1984) pointed out that labor search models often
contain multiple equilibria. These multiplicities exist for two reasons. The
ﬁrst has to do with externalities in the recruiting process of the kind studied
by Diamond (1982b), Mortensen (1984) and Pissarides (1984). The second
has to do with a bilateral monopoly problem. Howitt and McAfee (1987)
pointed out that this second problem leads, not just to a ﬁnite multiplicity of
equilibria, but to the existence of a continuum of steady state unemployment
rates.
The response in the literature to the Howitt-McAfee indeterminacy has
been to argue that the labor search model requires the addition of an equation
based on preferences, technology and endowments. A variety of candidates
have been proposed. The most common is the Nash bargaining solution that
allocates rents between a ﬁrm and a worker by assuming a ﬁxed bargaining
weight. This solution was widely perceived to be problematic after Shimer
(2005) showed that it leads to unreasonably small ﬂuctuations in unemploy-
ment, relative to the data, if the model is driven by productivity shocks.
Following Shimer’s observation, a variety of alternatives have been pro-
posed to the standard Nash bargaining approach including low worker bar-
gaining weight by Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008), and predetermined wages
by Farmer and Hollenhorst (2004) and Hall (2005a, 2005b). The predeter-
mined wage approach was developed further by Hall and Milgrom (2008),
Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008), who added
more complicated dynamic bargaining structures to explain the observed
sluggish movement of wages in data.
2In this paper, I propose a new approach. Instead of searching for a fun-
damental explanation to close an indeterminate model of the labor market,
I close the model with the assumption that ﬁrms produce as many goods as
are demanded. Demand, in turn, depends on beliefs of market participants
about the future value of assets. By embedding the indeterminate labor
search market into an asset pricing model, I show that the unemployment
rate can be explained as a steady state equilibrium where the indeterminacy
of equilibrium is resolved by assuming that the beliefs of market participants
are self-fulﬁlling.
To better understand what I am proposing I am going to begin by study-
ing what is already familiar. I will look at a neoclassical model that is
widely used to think about asset pricing. In Section 6 I will alter this model
by introducing an alternative model of the labor market. By contrasting the
two models, I hope the reader will gain a clear grasp of what I believe to be
an important diﬀerence in my approach that concerns the link between the
asset markets and the labor market. In both old-Keynesian and classical
economics, the value of stock market is equal to the net present value of the
dividends produced by the corporate sector. But in old-Keynesian economics
the link operates from asset prices to dividends rather than the other way
around.
3 Households in a Neoclassical Model
















Households earn a money wage  each period, pay  for consumption
 and borrow and lend at nominal interest rate .2 They face the sequence
2Throughout this paper I will measure prices in units of account that I call dollars.
3of budget constraints
+1 +  ≤ (1 + −1) +  (2)
where  is net ﬁnancial assets. In addition, the net present value of con-
sumption is bounded by the net present value of household wealth.3





























4 Production in a Neoclassical Model







 +  =1  (7)
Since all the models I will study are purely real, the models will determine only relative
prices.
3Since I assume that there is a representative household, the solution to this problem
with a single ﬁnancial asset is identical to the complete market solution. Adding additional
assets serves only to deﬁne the values of the relevant Arrow securities.
4There is a single unit of non-reproducible capital and a stochastic time vary-
ing productivity parameter . The competitive assumption implies


 =  (8)


 =  (9)
where  is the money rental rate and since I assume that  is the only
storable asset and this is a closed economy, the total ﬁnancial assets of the
household sector, , are equal to the nominal value of the capital stock,
 =  (10)
where  is the dollar price of capital. The assumption that capital is non
reproducible implies that,
 =1  (11)
5 Characterizing Equilibria

















































Equation (12) is the consumption Euler equation. Equation (13) is a
no-arbitrage condition that sets the expected return on capital, adjusted for
covariance with consumption, equal to the interest rate. Equations (14) and
(15) are the intratemporal ﬁrst order conditions for labor for the household
and the ﬁrm. Equation (16) is the production function and Equation (17) is
the ﬁrst order condition for capital from the ﬁrm’s maximization problem.
How are these equations solved to determine the behavior of prices and
quantities in a competitive equilibrium? To determine employment, we may








By combining (12), (13) and (17) and iterating the resulting equation for-
wards we may obtain an expression for the relative price of capital in terms





















6This model is familiar from the asset pricing literature. Suppose, for
example, that productivity shocks follow the following geometric random
walk,
 = −1 exp() (24)
where  is an iid mean zero random variable. Since  is given from Equation
(18), it follows from (19) that real GDP, equal to , will also follow a random
walk and from (23), the value of rental payments will be proportional to GDP.
As with any model with eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets and rational investors,
the model predicts that the value of a ﬁnancial asset is equal to the net present
value of its dividend stream. If we associate  with dividend payments and





Since  is proportional to GDP and GDP is driven by productivity shocks,
ﬂuctuations in  will be reﬂected in stock market prices. Diﬀerent assump-
tions about preferences and diﬀerent assumptions about the process that
drives  will lead to more complicated forms of this expression. But the
basic idea remains. The value of the stock market is determined by the
fundamentals that govern the stochastic productivity process.
6 Labor Markets with Search
The environment I have described is one that will be familiar to most readers
of this article. In this section I will modify the structure of the labor market
by introducing search. I begin by describing the environment and solving
a social planning problem. Later, I will describe two diﬀerent concepts of
equilibrium in the search economy. One is a model that is closed by assuming
that the real wage is determined by a Nash bargain. The other uses self-
fulﬁlling beliefs about the value of assets to determine employment.
7To describe the search economy I modify the utility function by assuming
that leisure does not give disutility. This modiﬁcation allows me to lay stress
on the extensive margin when I describe employment ﬂuctuations. It is
possible to allow for variable participation rates and variable hours but I have
not added those complications since they would obscure the main message
of the paper: In an economy with search, there may exist a continuum of
equilibria.









Households have a unit measure of household members each of whom searches
for a job,
 =1  (27)
I will amend the production technology from Section 4 by allowing the
ﬁrm to allocate workers to one of two activities; recruiting or production.
The social planner in this economy will direct the ﬁrm to allocate  workers
to recruiting and the remaining  workers to production. The total mea-
sure of workers employed in the representative ﬁrm is the sum of these two
quantities;
 =  +  (28)





units of goods and since I assume that  =1 , this simpliﬁes to
 =( )
  (30)






where Γ is a parameter that measure the eﬃciency of the recruiting technol-
ogy. I make the strong assumption that every period, the entire workforce is
ﬁred and must be rehired the following period.4
Since the ﬁrm begins the period with no workers, and since workers are
an essential input to recruiting, it might be argued that the ﬁrm can never
successfully hire a worker. Since I will be thinking of the time period of the
model as a quarter or a year, this assumption should be seen as a conve-
nient way of representing the equilibrium of a dynamic process. The planner
chooses a feasible 4−tuple {} and Equations (28) — (31) describe
the set of feasible plans.
The cost to the ﬁrm of hiring new workers is measured in labor units,
rather than output, in contrast to most search models. This innovation to
the standard search model is not important and is made for expositional
simplicity.
7 The Solution to the Social Planning Prob-
lem
In this economy there is a representative agent and no way of transferring
resources from one period to the next. It follows that the task of the so-
cial planner is to maximize output per person in every period by eﬃciently
allocating workers between recruiting and production.
Combining equations (28), (30) and (31), leads to the reduced form pro-
4If I did not make this assumption, employment would become a state variable and
the description of the dynamics of equilibria would become more involved. It is not too
diﬃcult to work out what happens in this case but since it complicates the algebra without




















The remaining workers will be unemployed and the socially optimal unem-








 is a natural candidate in this economy for the natural rate of unemploy-
ment.5
8 Households in a Search Model
The household sector is unaltered from the classical model with the excep-










subject to the constraints
+1 +  ≤ (1 + −1) +  (36)
 ≤ 1 (37)
 =˜  (38)
5Milton Friedman deﬁned the natural rate of unemployment as the equilibrium rate in
an economy that accounts for search frictions. That is not an appropriate deﬁnition in
this economy since, as we will see, there may be a continuum of equilibrium rates only one
of which coincides with the planning optimum.
10and the requirement that wealth is bounded. Equation (38) represents the
assumption that if  workers search, ˜  of them will ﬁnd a job where the
fraction ˜  is determined in equilibrium by the aggregate search technology.
Since leisure does not yield disutility, households will choose,
 =1  (39)
In addition, the household will allocate assets through time optimally. That












Since the household may also choose to invest in physical capital, the no



















9 Firms in a Search Model













subject to the constraints,
 =  +  (43)
 =  (44)
The money price  the money wage  and the money rental rate  are
taken as given. In addition, the ﬁrm takes the search eﬃciency of a recruiter,
 as given.
Think of the recruiting process as follows. The ﬁrm can attract as many
11job applicants as it desires at the wage , but not all job applicants are well
matched to the ﬁrm. Suitable workers must be screened by the personnel
department. The variable 
−1
 represents screening costs. If  is high, then
screening costs are low and a given pool of job applicants will yield more
workers that are well matched to the ﬁrm. If  is low then screening costs
are high and a given pool of job applicants will yield fewer suitable workers.
The ﬁrm decides on the number of applicants to process by choosing the size
of its recruiting department, .
This story is a simple extension of the usual description of a competitive
labor market. As in the competitive model, the ﬁrm can choose to hire
as many workers as it needs at the competitive wage. If a ﬁrm were to
oﬀer less than the competitive wage it would receive no applications. It has
no incentive to oﬀer a higher wage since the match quality of applicants is
independent of the wage. The variable, , which is taken parametrically by
each ﬁrm, represents the number of workers that will be hired, after screening,
by a single worker allocated to the recruiting department and it is analogous
to the labor market tightness variable in a standard search model.
We can use equations (42) — (44) to derive a reduced form problem for
the ﬁrm that resembles that of the ﬁrm in a neoclassical model. Substituting
equations (43) and (44) into (42) and deﬁning
Θ =( 1− 1) (45)























Notice that equations (47) and (48) are the same as those that would
hold in a perfectly competitive labor market. They represent the two ﬁrst
order conditions for proﬁt maximization. The model diﬀers from a com-
petitive model since the recruiting eﬃciency parameter Θ is endogenously
determined by aggregate economic activity but is taken parametrically by
the ﬁrm. I will show below that this externality allows the model to display
a continuum of search equilibria each of which is consistent with proﬁtm a x -
imization by individual ﬁrms and optimizing behavior by forward looking
households with rational expectations.
10 Search Equilibrium
The variables Θ ˜  and , are determined in equilibrium by market clearing
in the markets for search inputs. To see how this works, it helps if we place
a bar over a variable to represent its aggregate value. For example, ¯  is
the measure of aggregate employment and  is the measure of workers hired
by the average ﬁrm. These variables are conceptually distinct although they
turn out to be equal in equilibrium.
Using this notation and recognizing that everybody will look for a job,






This equation represents the relationship between recruiters and the number
of workers hired in the economy as a whole. Each individual ﬁrm assumes
instead that the following relationship holds between its own recruiting eﬀort
13 and the number of workers that it can hire,
 =  (50)
If we impose the symmetric equilibrium assumption,  = ¯  and  = ¯ ,i t













A similar calculation for households gives the value of ˜ 
˜  = ¯  (53)
Equation (52) deﬁnes a term, Θ that looks like a productivity shock
but is in fact a recruiting externality. Some intuition may be helpful at this
point.
In this model, there is a continuum of labor market equilibria. In a
high unemployment equilibrium, Θ and the real wage are both high. The
productivity of a recruiter is high because all ﬁrms allocate a small fraction
of employed workers to recruiting and congestion eﬀects are small.
In a low unemployment equilibrium, Θ and the real wage are both low.
The productivity of a recruiter is low because all ﬁrms allocate a large fraction
of employed workers to recruiting and congestion eﬀects are large.
1411 Characterizing Equilibrium
How do the equations of the old-Keynesian model compare with those of









































These are the consumption Euler equation, (54), the no arbitrage equation
(55), and the ﬁrst order conditions for capital and labor, (56) and (57). But
in the search economy, there is no labor supply equation and the production
















12 Closing the Model with Bargaining
The search model has ﬁve equations, (54) — (58) to determine the six un-
knowns, ½














15The missing equation arises from the absence of markets to allocate search
intensity between the time of searching workers and the recruiting activities
of ﬁrms, a point ﬁrst made by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988). To ﬁll this void,
it has been usual for search theorists to complete the model by assuming that,
when a worker meets a ﬁrm, the worker and the ﬁrm bargain over the surplus
of a match. Since the worker has no reservation disutility, the surplus to a















If we assume that the ﬁrm pays its recruiting workers in advance and bargains






















Solving the free entry condition






 −  =0  (65)
6This assumption makes the current problem comparable with standard bargaining
theories in which ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed cost to post a vacancy.
16for , and using the fact that the capital market is competitive gives the




In words, employment is equal to the bargaining weight of the ﬁrm. If
the bargaining weight , is equal to the elasticity of the matching function,
equal to 12 in this example, the well known Hosios (1990) condition holds
and the bargaining solution is eﬃcient.
13 Closing the Model with Beliefs
In this paper I propose a diﬀerent solution to the indeterminacy problem. I
see no reason to treat the search model diﬀerently from any other competitive
model with externalities and I view the addition of the bargaining equation
as arbitrary. Instead I propose to use the model of the labor market that
I have described to explore the idea that market psychology, Keynes called
this animal spirits, can exert an independent inﬂuence on economic activity.
In any model with rational agents, the value of an asset will equal the net
present value of the ﬂows that arise from owning it. This must be true in
the old-Keynesian model just as it is true in the classical model. Combining
equations (54) — (56) and solving iteratively leads to the same expression





If we associate  with the value of the stock market and  with the value
of dividends, Equation (67) represents a familiar asset pricing relationship.
In a classical model, the stock market ﬂuctuates as rational, forward looking
individuals estimate the fundamental value of the net present value of their
dividends. In the old-Keynesian model I will argue that the direction of
17causation for this relationship is reversed.
According to an often cited passage in The General Theory, the stock
market is like a beauty contest in which the judges must judge, not the
beauty of the individual contestants, but how they think the other judges
will rank them. One possible interpretation of that idea, in conjunction with
the search model I have described, is that real labor market outcomes are
determined by self-fulﬁlling beliefs. To represent this idea, I propose to close







where  is a process that represents how beliefs are inﬂuenced by economic
events.
 could be determined in a variety of ways. It plays a similar role in
this model to that of government expenditure or taxes in a conventional
macroeconomic model. It is typical to treat those variables as exogenous
although there are clearly feedback eﬀects from the economy to the political
process. As economists we often treat those eﬀects as the domain of political
scientists. By analogy, I see  as capturing the role of psychology on the
stock market. Diﬀerent models for the evolution of beliefs will have diﬀerent
implications for the behavior of all of the endogenous variables of the model.
Table 1 compares the old-Keynesian model with the classical model and
with a search model closed with the Nash Bargaining assumption. Equa-
tions (T1) through (T4) in Table 1 are the same in all three models. In the
two search models the technology, Equation (T5), diﬀers from the competi-
tive model to reﬂect the presence of recruiting externalities. Equation (T6)
compares the competitive labor supply equation with two alternative ways
of closing the search model. In the bargaining model, employment is con-
stant in equilibrium as it is in the competitive model.7 In the old-Keynesian
7To see this, compare Equation (T3) with the bargaining version of Equation (T6).
18search model employment may vary in response to both productivity shocks
and belief shocks.







+1 (1 + )
o
























Competitive Bargaining Old Keynesian
Model Search Model Search Model
(T5)  =( )






















How do these three models compare in their empirical predictions? That






where  is an iid random variable with zero mean. In that case, the model
predicts that real value of the stock market is a martingale simply because
people believe that it will be so. If expectations are rational then  will







the assumption that wealth follows an independent process leads to a model
where real GDP is driven by wealth ﬂuctuations that themselves arise from
beliefs about asset values. Employment in this version of the model would











where  represents productivity shocks and  are belief shocks. In the old-
Keynesian model, driven by beliefs, employment will ﬂuctuate in response
to both belief shocks and productivity shocks. Equation (71) demonstrates
that, if beliefs are independent of productivity shocks, employment will be
negatively correlated with productivity. More generally, one might expect
that fundamental events will inﬂuence the value of the stock market through
Equation (69). By specifying the nature of that dependence, the model
is capable of capturing any observed correlation between productivity and
employment. In contrast, the classical model and the bargaining model both
lead to constant employment.
Could one devise an empirical test to distinguish the belief driven model
from its classical and bargaining counterparts? I am skeptical. Certainly
any given model of belief formation can be rejected by the data. And in that
sense the theory, once supplemented by a speciﬁcation of beliefs, has bite.
But the class of all belief driven models cannot perform worse than any given
bargaining model since there will always exist a function which describes how
beliefs are formed that makes the two theories observationally equivalent.
For example, in the bargaining version of the search model,  is constant




It follows from the other equations of the model that the real value of the





By choosing equation (73) as an independent driving equation that describes
20the formation of beliefs, the old-Keynesian model will mimic exactly, the
behavior of the bargaining model. If one is willing to treat the bargaining
parameter , as time dependent, the reverse is also true. Any process for
beliefs in the old-Keyensian model implies a sequences of bargaining weights
{} that makes the two models observationally equivalent.
14 Why I Favor the Old-Keynesian Model
The old-Keynesian model that I have described cannot be directly compared
with the workhorse real business cycle model, (RBC), because I have ab-
stracted from investment in the models described in this paper. I made this
choice because the intertemporal substitution mechanism that drives em-
ployment ﬂuctuations in the RBC model is not necessary to understand
employment variations in the old-Keynesian model. And since the canonical
RBC model has only one good, the relative price of the capital good in terms
of the consumption good is always equal to one. That is not a good model
to discuss the relationship of stock market valuation with unemployment.
Why am I interested in that comparison? Because there is a close corre-
lation between the value of the stock market and the value of unemployment
during major recessions. Figures 1 and 2 compare the dollar value of the
S&P 500 and the unemployment rate over two diﬀerent decades. Figure 1
covers the period from January 1928 through December 1939 and Figure 2
is from December of 2001 through December of 2010. In both ﬁgures the
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sg r a p h e do nt h er i g h ta x i so na ni n v e r t e ds c a l ea n dt h e
S&P is graphed as an index number on the left scale. NBER recessions
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October 28th 1929
Figure 1: Unemployment and the Stock Market During the Great Depression
I realize that correlation is not causation and these graphs do not prove
that the stock market crash caused the Great Depression. However, they do
suggest to me that a theory that does make that causal link deserves further
consideration. Old-Keynesian economics is one such theory. The bargaining
model of search and the classical labor market with logarithmic preferences
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Figure 2: Unemployment and the Stock Market over the Last Decade
A critic might respond that it is unfair to compare the old-Keynesian
model with a classical model that abstracts from investment since the in-
tertemporal substitution mechanism has been shut down in that model.
In the RBC economy labor hours ﬂuctuate because households voluntarily
choose to work harder during booms.
While that is a fair point, I would respond that replacing the competitive
labor market of that model, with the old-Keynesian search model, cannot
possibly perform worse than the competitive labor market model since there
is a speciﬁcation for beliefs under which the two models make the same
predictions. Further, the extent to which the RBC model fails badly is con-
nected with the implausibility of the labor supply equation which forces hours
worked and consumption to move in opposite directions as long as leisure is a
normal good (Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers, 1985). That is precisely
the equation that I have removed by adding a model of search.
Perhaps the RBC model is the wrong alternative. Much progress has been
made recently on search models with sticky wages and those models behave
23much like the one discussed in this paper. But recent work that estimates a
model in this class by Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2010) ﬁnds an important
role for wage markup shocks in estimated data. The model studied by these
authors is closest to the bargaining model of search that I described in this
paper.
The Gali-Smets-Wouters model is a close cousin of the bargaining version
of the labor search model. In that model, Gali-Smets-Wouters’ wage markup
shock would be represented as a shock to the bargaining weight. Since
the model with time varying bargaining weights is isomorphic to the old-
Keynesian model why should one prefer one model over the other? In both
models one would observe that a stock market crash is correlated with a drop
in employment and a shift in the bargaining weight. But in the absence of a
good theory of why the bargaining weight shifted dramatically in 1929 and
again in 2008 I ﬁnd it more plausible to think that the direction of causation
in both cases was from self-fulﬁlling beliefs in the asset markets to a drop in
aggregate demand.
Two papers have estimated versions of the old-Keynesian model. Gelain
and Guerrazzi (2010) use Bayesian methods to estimate a version of the
Old-Keynesian model due to Guerrazzi (2010) on both US and European
data with encouraging results. Farmer (2010a) compares a three equation
monetary version of the old-Keynesian model with a three equation new-
Keynesian model. Farmer’s estimates of the old-Keynesian model replace
the Phillips curve with a belief function that describes the evolution of self-
fulﬁlling beliefs about nominal income growth. He compares the posterior
odds ratio for the two speciﬁcations and ﬁnds that the old-Keynesian model
outperforms the new-Keynesian model. The reason for this improved ﬁti s
the ability of the old-Keynesian model to explain persistent unemployment
as a demand driven phenomenon. There is a version of the new-Keynesian
model that will perform as well, but it requires one to assume that persistent
movements in the unemployment rate are caused by changes in the prefer-
24ences of households for leisure. In other words, the new-Keynesian model
can only capture persistence of the unemployment rate if it is the natural
rate of unemployment that is moving over time.
15 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that, in modern market economies, it is costly to
match unemployed workers with vacant jobs. Because there are no markets
for the search time of unemployed workers or the search time of corporate
recruiters, free market economies do not provide the necessary price signals
to ensure that a given number of jobs is ﬁlled in the right way. Because the
relevant price signals are missing, a market economy can become stuck in an
equilibrium with a high unemployment rate. There are many such equilibria
and almost all of them are socially ineﬃcient.
In the model of the paper, ﬁrms decide how many workers to hire based on
the demand for the goods that they produce. The demand for goods depends
on wealth and every wealth level is associated with a diﬀerent equilibrium
unemployment rate and a diﬀerent set of prices for factories and machines.
The value of these physical assets depends on what market participants think
they will be worth in the future.
This paradigm provides us with a new way to think about large recessions
like the Great Depression and the Great Recession of 2007—2009. Using the
model from this paper I would argue that the world economy in 2008 was
headed rapidly towards a high unemployment, low wealth, equilibrium. The
move to this bad equilibrium was triggered by a loss of conﬁdence in the
value of assets, backed by mortgages in the US subprime mortgage market.
The inability to value these assets led to an ampliﬁcation of the crisis as
panic hit the global ﬁnancial markets.
In the winter of 2011, the US labor market had still not recovered. I
believe that much of the problem is connected with a lack of conﬁdence by
25global investors who are concerned with the possibility of a further collapse.
Even though the US stock market may be appropriately valued based on
historical price earnings ratios — market participants are concerned that the
value of stocks could fall further. Variations in the level of conﬁdence
are manifested in changing risk premia that are fully rational given the
unpredictable behavior of future traders in the asset markets. Recognizing
t h en a t u r eo fap r o b l e mi saﬁrst, and necessary step, towards ﬁnding its
solution. I hope, in this paper, to have made a contribution to this ﬁrst step.
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